tion in their own ranks, while most shied away from further "bureaucratic" entanglements.6 On the other hand, the dream of harmony between corporate management and industrial labor dissolved into even more bitter conflict, first over the enforcement of NRA-sponsored code provisions protecting the interests of labor, and then over the emergence of labor unions independent of direct management control. These conflicts, moreover, fed back into the administrative and representative processes of government in ways that eventually led to the passage of the "Wagner" National Labor Relations Act to legalize independent labor unions. ' Meanwhile, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration proved much more successful in organizing commercial farmers for their own collective good than did the NRA at organizing industrial capitalists.8 Between 1933 and 1936, the AAA contributed to raising farm prices toward "parity"-that is, raising farm prices relative to industrial prices so that the ratio approximated the pre-World War I standard of "prosperity" for American agriculture. What is more, commercial farmers, especially those of the South and Midwest, gained important political benefits as a by-product of AAA activities. A major farm lobby organization, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), was able to expand its operations in tandem with the local administration of production control programs under the AAA. In turn, from the mid-1930s on, the AFBF became pivotal in defending its own organizational interests and the class interests of commercial farmers. Whereas industrial capitalists ended up losing relative power to labor unions, commercial farmers were ultimately able to use well-institutionalized farm programs to beat back all challenges from the agricultural underclasses and to gain an enduring governmental niche within the post-New Deal political economy.
The full political effects of the Recovery Act's failure vis-a-vis the Adjustment Act's relative success cannot be explored in this article. But even to allude to these effects is to underline the importance of the fate of these two programs in the overall trajectory of the New Deal. Regardless of whether either program was successful in strictly economic terms,9 it is obviously important to under- . Observers doubt whether either the NRA or the AAA did much to promote national economic recovery. Yet the AAA seems to have contributed to the stand why the New Deal's initial effort to intervene in agriculture was institutionalized so much more successfully than its effort to regulate industry. This question becomes all the more intriguing when we realize that neither conventional pluralism nor conventional Marxism offers much help in answering it. Despite their sharp disagreements over the basic source and significance of power in society, both of these theoretical approaches seek to explain political outcomes in socially determinist ways. Thus pluralist theory suggests that the best organized interest groups in society, and those with access to the greatest political skills and resources, would be the ones to achieve their political goals in "the governmental process"-with the proviso, of course, that some compromise might have to be reached to satisfy other somewhat powerful and resourceful interests also involved in the political process. ' 0 As for Marxism, its various adherents would all tend to agree on one conclusion: capitalists as a class should benefit most from politics in capitalist society. Some Marxists would attribute this to capitalists' direct control over the state or political resources;" other neo-Marxists would say, instead, that the state can be expected to intervene "relatively autonomously" for the objective interests of the capitalist system (and class), regardless of whether or not capitalists control political decision making.'2 Either way, however, political outcomes (short of revolution) should work disproportionately to the benefit of capitalists.
But in light of these general expectations created by pluralism and Marxism, the paths of development of the National Industrial Recovery and Agricultural Adjustment Act cannot but seem surprising in various ways. To begin with the NIRA: Industrial capitalists were highly organized by 1932.13 Not only were large firms formidable entities in their own right, there were also effective trade associations in many industries, and there were business-wide bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers. With remarkable unity from late 1931 on, industrialists and their representatives raising of farm income while the increases in profits that capitalists had hoped would follow upon the stabilization of production and the regulation of conditions of competition under the NRA failed to materialize in many industries.
' pressed upon federal authorities a single major strategy for the recovery of American industry: the relaxation of the antitrust laws and government sponsorship for industry-by-industry cooperation to coordinate prices and regulate production levels and conditions of employment.'4 Indeed, through the National Industrial Recovery Act, industrial capitalists got pretty much what they asked for-and their control over the implementation of the recovery program was even more complete than was their influence in the legislative process that produced the NIRA. Yet, this program of government intervention, although tailored to the industrialists' specifications, nevertheless led or contributed to very unwanted outcomes for the capitalists: internecine political quarrels, threats of increased government supervision, and the legalization of independent labor unions.
Farmers in the United States were not as highly organized as industrialists at the beginning of the 1930s. And, perhaps even more important, competing "national" farmers' associations were pushing quite different programs for farm recovery as late as 1932.15 During Roosevelt's presidential campaign and in the months between his election and inauguration, the major farm organizationsthe Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, and the Farmers' Unionhad to be coaxed into supporting the innovative production-control provisions that eventually became embodied in the Adjustment Act. (The Farmers' Union, in fact, ultimately refused to go along.) Yet, even though the ideas for key AAA programs did not originate with farmers or their interest-group representatives, farmers still ended up doing well, both economically and politically, under the New Deal's venture of government intervention in agriculture. Thus, in neither the case of the Adjustment Act or Recovery Act can the demands, the organization, or the class economic power of social groups directly explain the results of the New Deal government interventions affecting the interests of either farmers or industrialists. To accomplish such explanation, we must go beyond the social-determinist proclivities of conventional pluralism and conventional Marxism alike.
Our explanatory approach centers on the issue of state capacity. Decisions made by governments cannot always be carried through; there is no law guaranteeing that governmental authorities will attempt only those interventions that they really can execute. The administrative organization of government is crucial, especially when policies calling for increased government intervention are to be implemented. Governments that have, or can quickly assemble, their own knowledgeable administrative organizations are better able to carry through interventionist policies than are governments that must rely on extragovernmental experts and organizations. For historical reasons specified below, the U.S. national state in the early 1930s had greater capacity to intervene autonomously in the economic affairs of agriculture than in industry. Both the Recovery and Adjustment Acts pledged the early New Deal to grandiose objectives and granted broad interventionist authority to the government. But given the state capacities actually at hand, it explicably turned out that the NIRA promised the truly impossible, while the Adjustment Act set its sights, in part, on attainable goals.
THE WEAKNESS OF THE AMERICAN STATE AND THE

FAILURE OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION
In his 1939 book, Business Cycles, Joseph Schumpeter underlined the absence of a previously entrenched "skilled civil service," an "experienced bureaucracy" in New Deal America: "As a rule, . . . reforming governments enjoy at least the advantage of having that indispensable tool ready at hand -in most historical instances it grew up along with the tendencies which they represent . . . In this country a new bureaucracy had suddenly to be created."'"6 Nowhere was this more true than when it came to implementing the NIRA's program of industrial regulation. As Schumpeter's observation suggests, the National Recovery Administration can best be understood by focusing on the prior historical development of the U.S. state.
During the nineteenth century the U.S. national polity was uniquely "stateless." It was, as Stephen Skowronek has put it, a government of "courts and parties" -one that functioned remarkably well in an expanding, decentralized capitalist economy. '7 A potent judicial system regulated and defended property rights, while locally rooted and highly competitive mass political parties handed out divisable economic benefits to meet their patronage requirements. The parties knit together the various levels and branches of government and placed severe limitations on the expansion of any bureaucratic administration or civil service composed of positions outside the electoral-patronage system. The way was finally opened for the construction of autonomous national administrative systems -civil and military alike -but only after the electoral realignment of 1896 sharply unbalanced the parties in many formerly competitive states and created a national imbalance strongly in favor of the Republicans. Even so, administrative development came slowly, unevenly, and in ways imperfectly under central executive coordination and control. Presidents from Theodore Roosevelt onward took the lead, along with groups of professionals, in pro- involvement in a modern international war came only after the emergence of a national capitalist economy in which capitalist corporations had taken the lead in the development of bureaucracy and in the employment of trained experts. Existing federal bureaucracies were not prepared to mobilize human resources and coordinate the industrial economy for war, so emergency agencies were thrown together for the occasion, mostly staffed by professional experts and "businesscrats" temporarily recruited from the corporate capitalist sector.'8 The major agency for industrial mobilization, the War Industries Board (WIB), was headed by freewheeling financier Bernard Baruch, who used business executives-turned-government officials to hound corporations into a semblance of cooperation in support of the war effort.'9 Because America's involvement in World War I was relatively brief, and because the task was to orchestrate a profitable overall expansion of production, the WIB's very tenuous ability to coordinate economic flows, control prices, and manage the interface between the military and industry was never made as glaringly apparent as it might have been. And once the "emergency" of war had passed, Congress quickly dismantled agencies such as the WIB, leaving the U.S. national state in many ways as administratively weak as before the war and leaving corporations on their own to pursue profitable growth, intramural control of their labor forces, and whatever industry-wide cooperation they could achieve without violating antitrust laws.
During their unbroken national political ascendancy in the 1920s, Republican administrations showed little inclination to extend the reach of bureaucratic state power. Instead, a distinctive way of extending government influence-an antibureaucratic strategy of state-building particularly well suited to the existing political and ideological circumstances -was ingeniously pursued by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, using his own initially relatively humble department, "the smallest and the newest of the federal departments," as a center of operations.20 To Hoover, starting from a puny administrative base did not mat- In one way of looking at it, the National Recovery Administration had to start from scratch to implement government-supervised industrial coordination. But in another way of looking at it, the Recovery Administration simply reproduced still another variant of the same governmental strategies used to "mobilize business" under Bernard Baruch's War Industries Board and used to "cooperate with business" under Hoover's "associative state." For the implications of the American state's persistent administrative weakness were to prove as telling for the NRA as they had been for the previous major phases of government-business relations in twentieth-century America. To a discerning eye, the prodromal signs were already apparent in the spring of 1933, as Roosevelt became extraordinarily reliant upon one man, General Hugh Johnson, to put together the entire NRA apparatus needed to implement Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act.28
Aptly, the early NRA has been characterized as "the swirling chaos over which Hugh Johnson reigned."29 The tasks at hand were exhilarating and overwhelming. An entire NRA staff, destined to grow to over 3,000, had to be instantly assembled. "working with Johnson -or as they referred to him privately, Old Ironpantswas like trying to tame a whirlwind: if they succeeded, they would hold the reins on a source of tremendous power; if they failed, the whirlwind might well destroy them and all of their plans."32 When the dust settled after the first hectic months of the NRA, it certainly seemed that the business executives had succeeded in taming the whirlwind. Between June and October 1933, the major industries were brought under approved codes of fair competition, and processes were well under way that would result in over 500 codes covering about 96 percent of U.S. industry.33 All codes necessarily embodied wage and hours provisions for labor, along with the proforma NIRA Section (7a) provision declaring labor's right to organize collectively. Despite these features, business leaders -especially the trade associations that represented many decentralized industries and the large corporations that dominated many oligopolistic industries -succeeded in formulating the codes so as to allow many loopholes in prolabor provisions as well as production cutbacks and noncompetitive, higher prices for most industries.
The key officials of the early NRA (besides Johnson himself) were "deputy administrators drawn almost invariably from the ranks of business" -indeed, sometimes from the very same industries withi which they had to negotiate over code provisions.34 These administrators were strongly sympathetic to the needs of the industrialists for a profitable environment and an end to "cutthroat competition" in the deflationary crisis. Beyond dealing with NRA "businesscrats" who were inherently sympathetic, industrial executives had even greater advantages in that they closely controlled most of the information about industrial operations on which the NRA codes and their enforcement would have to be based. "When the recovery program began," notes Galambos, "the government did not have much more information [on the workings of industry] than it had during the first World War."35 Nor were there at hand trained government officials experienced in regulating or planning for industry with "the public interest" and some conception of the whole economy in mind. What is more, industrialists possessed the only organizational means-the trade associations-that could conveniently be used to implement the codes, once approved.36 Most code authorities established for this purpose were selected and staffed by trade association personnel or industrial executives; and even the "government representatives" serving as code authorities were usually nominated by the Industrial Advisory Board of the NRA, a body itself made up of elite U.S. capitalists. Labor representatives, meanwhile, appeared on less than 10 percent of the initially established code authorities, and representatives of consumers made it onto a mere 2 percent.37 A contemporary observer was hardly exaggerating, therefore, when he described the early NRA as a "bargain between business leaders on the one hand and businessmen in the guise of government officials on the other."38 General Johnson corralled the various participants and made them play the codification game very quickly, but business executives and their organizations held all the good cards. So, naturally, they came up winners-at least in the first round of play.
Rapid codification accomplished in this way soon led, however, to increasingly bitter controversies within the NRA. Business executives found that legalized regulation and planning by industries' own efforts, rather than by state initiative, resulted in an incoherent pattern of cross-cutting jurisdictions and a proliferation of administrative red tape. As Ellis Hawley points out: "In the beginning,... almost any group of businessmen that saw fit to call itself an 'industry' was treated as such, and the result was an amalgam of overlapping jurisdictions. . . . Caught in this tangle of multiple code coverage, many businessmen found themselves subject to conflicting orders, multiple assessments, and overlapping interpretations. . . ."39 Besides, by joining the NRA effort, business executives inevitably brought conflicts within and between industries into a political arena. There were "conflicts between large units and small ones, integrated firms and non-integrated, chain stores and independents, manufacturers and distributors, new industries and declining ones, and so on ad infinitum."40 Naturally, industries and subgroups within industries tried to use the NRA codes to their own relative advantage. And the NRA apparatus, itself thoroughly permeated by conflicting business interests, was unable to resolve disputes in an authoritative fashion. At worst, internecine feuds among business groups intensified; at best, they settled into uneasy stalemates. Either way, many business executives were bound to become increasingly frustrated with the NRA.
Finally, business's disillusionment with the NRA had roots in the failure of even the most successful self-regulatory codes to ensure market stability and steady profitability. Louis Galambos tells a revealing story in this respect for the cotton textile industry -an industry whose trade association, the Cotton Textile Institute (CTI), led the way in the fight for government-enforced industrial guilds and then drew up the very first code to be approved under the NRA. The code authority in cotton textiles was directly established by the CTI, and during 1933-1934 it was remarkably successful in maintaining its authority within the industry and its autonomy from unwanted interference by government officials. Nevertheless, the code authority in cotton textiles was still having difficulty in 1934 with the hoary problem of how to fine-tune flows of production in the industry so as to prevent inventory backlogs from building up and undercutting steady profitable yields. The trouble was that the code authority, as a representative of firms in the industry, could react to manifest problems, but could not anticipate difficulties before they impinged directly and decisively upon a large majority of the members. By opting for self-regulation instead of central planning, CTI had ensured that this handicap would be built into its NRA program.
[Cotton Textile Institute officials] recognized by the summer of 1934 that prices could not be stabilized so long as the manufacturers' product groups had to initiate the decisions to cut production. They needed to give that responsibility to a person or persons who could keep in touch with the statistical reports and check any overproduction before it became serious. But that idea carried the association leaders onto dangerous ground: the experts who made these decisions might end up being government experts, and to the manufacturers that was an outcome to be avoided at any cost.4' Perhaps if there had existed from the start a well-established state administration knowledgeable about and sympathetic to the needs and aims of the business self-regulators, perhaps then the NRA, in its capacity as a government agency responsible for coordinating the formation of cartels of U.S. business enterprises, could have worked as the U.S. industrialists who initially pushed for it hoped it would. Under such circumstances, some U.S. capitalists (at least) would have consistently benefited from state-enforced plans and regulations, and they would not have perceived state administrators as threatening "meddlers." As it was, however, by the time expert administrators with their own ideas on how government intervention could induce recovery emerged within the NRA, they were seen as very threatening by capitalists, because they were acting as spokesmen for consumer and labor interests and were advocating social reforms as a concomitant of increased state regulation of certain aspects of business performance.42 Under these circumstances, even industries that might have benefited from more state planning -or at least from more effective state backing for their own attempts at market regulation -simply shied further away than ever from the notion of "government interference in industry." Despite -indeed, because of-the enormous influence they had in its operations, the NRA did not meet the original hopes of industrial capitalists for economic recovery through government-backed industrial coordination. And as the NRA became ever more conflict-ridden in 1934-1935, it actually generated dysfunctional side effects for its original business advocates. It helped to arouse and politicize labor-management struggles, and it set increasing numbers of disillusioned capitalists on a collision course with New Deal politicians. The virtually complete absence of autonomous capacity to administer industrial planning in the U.S. polity of the early 1930s condemned the NRA to be, at first, a charismatic mobilization effort, and then an arena of bitterly politicized and inconclusive conflicts. Whether the NIRA implied state planning for industry, or merely state coordination and backing for business planning, it asked too much of the public intelligence and the government machinery of the time. Consequently, as the New Deal continued, U.S. capitalists would learn that it was perhaps worse to have tried the NRA experiment and failed than not to have tried at all.
Commercial farmers, meanwhile, were learning a different lesson about the effects of government intervention in the agricultural economy. For, as shown below, the public intelligence and governmental machinery of the day were sufficient to realize the aims of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.
THE FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL COMPLEX AND THE ROOTS
OF THE AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ADMINISTRATION
When the Agricultural Adjustment Administration was hastily launched in the spring of 1933, there was as much potential for bureaucratic confusion, and even more likelihood of policy conflict and stalemate, as in the National Recovery Administration. Like the NRA, the organization of the AAA had to be assembled anew in a very short time, and the omnibus possibilities of the enabling legislation had to be embodied in actual programs. In a sense the nascent AAA was even more handicapped than the NRA, because contradictory programmatic emphases had been deliberately built into its initial leadership and organizational structure.43
By the spring of 1933, Roosevelt was personally convinced that a program of government-induced production controls for major staple crops (for example, cotton, wheat, and corn and hogs) was the best way to raise farm prices to parity. But advocates of marketing programs (calling for price fixing and the export-dumping of surpluses) were still politically strong within farmers' organizations, in the world of business, and in Congress. -Characteristically, Roosevelt simply melded together the divergent approaches, not only in the Agricultural Adjustment Act, but also in construction of the AAA itself. George N. Peek, a determined advocate of marketing programs, was made administrator of the AAA, yet he was made responsible to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace, who, along with his assistant secretary, Rexford Tugwell, was a confirmed believer in production controls. Commodities sections were the key operational parts of the AAA, the places where policies for each major crop would actually be formulated. Understandably worried that his policy preferences might lose out to the production-control advocates who were being recruited to head several key sections, Peek insisted on a dual structure for the major crops. Thus, in an ideal formula for administrative confusion and stalemate, a Division of Processing and Marketing run completely by Peek and his appointees was set up to parallel the Division of Production, and duplicate sec-tions for wheat, cotton, and corn and hogs were established within the two divisions. There was no way to coordinate programs for these key crops except by recourse to the administrator (Peek himself) or, if his decisions were disputed, by appeal to Secretary Wallace or the president.
Policy clashes and appeals aplenty to higher authorities indeed abounded during the first nine months of the AAA. Nevertheless, the AAA's overall trajectory of development from 1933 to 1935 did not parallel the NRA's path toward greater divisiveness and ultimate stalemate. During 1933, a production-control program for wheat was formulated and implemented with some success, and (as plans were made for controls in 1934) emergency crop-destruction programs were carried through for cotton and hogs.44 A series of clashes within the AAA pitted Peek and his people against the production-control advocates.45 Peek had important business allies among processors of agricultural products, who naturally opposed production cutbacks. As late as August 1933, Peek was "still arguing that the whole farm problem could be solved by marketing agreements that would fix prices paid to farmers" and dispose of surpluses on the world market.46 Peek was, moreover, determined to shield the business records of processing companies from AAA bureaucrats who were trying to keep down prices to consumers. But, after a number of showdowns on various issues -showdowns involving Wallace, and ultimately the president -Peek was forced out of the AAA and replaced as administrator by Chester A. Davis, a convert to the production-control approach.
Davis soon moved to reorganize the AAA, eliminating the parallel divisions by merging the sections under Processing and Marketing into the division of Production. During 1934, the AAA's programs-except for special cases like dairy products-became consistently oriented to raising farm prices by making payments to farmers to curtail their production. Overall plans were made by AAA experts in Washington and then implemented locally by committees of farmers. On the whole, the AAA functioned well. ricultural Adjustment Act was declared unconstitutional and a new approach to production planning had to be quickly proposed to Congress. In the case of the AAA-in contrast to the NRA-new, substitute legislation (the Soil Conservation Act of 1936, followed by the second Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938) was proposed and passed. Appropriate plans were available, and there was widespread political support for continuing the relatively successful efforts at government intervention in agriculture. If, therefore, the AAA's relative success contrasts fairly clearly to the faltering of the NRA after 1933, how can we explain the difference? It might be argued that the task of regulating production and raising prices in agriculture was so much easier than the task of regulating industrial production, thereby making it possible to account for the entire difference between the AAA and the NRA in sheer economic terms alone. Agricultural production occurs on an annual cycle, with fewer key decisions to be regulated over time than in industrial production, where cycles from inputs to outputs are much more rapid. Yet there is an offsetting way in which regulation of industry should have been administratively easier: most production in many industries took place in small numbers of large firms, making interenterprise coordination potentially much easier than in agriculture, where production decisions on millions of family farms had to be coordinated and supervised. Otherwise, attempts to control production and raise prices inevitably created economic tensions within both sectors. Just as some industries bought the products of others, so did some farmers (for example, hog farmers) buy the products of other farmers (corn); and there were tradeoffs between competing products within both sectors. Finally, politicized class conflicts could (and did) emerge within both sectors; just as the organization and price of labor was an ever-present issue for industrial managers in their dealings with the NRA, so were conflicts between laborers or sharecroppers and farm owners a potent source of conflicts under the AAA, especially for cotton growers in the South. We would not deny that the economically determined sources of administrative difficulty faced by the NRA and the AAA were different in many particular ways. But we do maintain that these difficulties were sufficiently comparable -in either parallel or offsetting ways -to justify looking to contrasts in state capacity for economic intervention as a major, independent explanation for why the AAA ended up achieving its administrative goals more successfully than did the NRA.
Uniquely among the major emergency agencies of the early New Deal, the AAA was placed inside an existing federal department -the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) -and under the authority of its secretary, rather than being placed under a special administrator reporting directly to the president. The latter was the arrangement for the NRA, and we have already suggested reasons University of Missouri Press, 1966), chap. 5. The original AAA production-control programs had negative side effects -for example, encouraging wasteful patterns of land use -that planners in the AAA were hoping to overcome; the invalidation of the first AAA gave them a welcome opportunity to try some new approaches. why little would have been gained by the NRA had it been put into the Commerce Department. In the case of the AAA, however, Secretary of Agriculture Wallace actively coordinated the special agency's activities with established USDA programs, and the AAA in fact benefited in numerous concrete ways from its embeddedness in the department. "There were some instances of friction between the AAA and the older organizations," notes historian Van Perkins; "more common, however, and rather remarkable, was the sense of accommodation and cooperation which existed. One of the most important connections was that between the AAA and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, [BAE], which performed a considerable amount of statistical and analytical work for the AAA... .The records that had been compiled over the years by the BAE's Division of Crop and Livestock Estimates were indispensable for all control programs because, without those statistics, it would have been impossible to determine base production, allotments, and benefits."49 In addition to resources of information, the AAA also drew key trained personnel from other parts of the USDA, especially from among present and previous employees of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics.50 Moreover, the federally supervised Extension Service, tied to the USDA since the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, provided both personnel for the AAA and a ready-made field administration for organizing local groups of farmers to implement AAA programs. Without the Extension Service, the AAA in 1933 would have faced the almost impossible task of assembling a field administration from scratch in a matter of weeks. 51 Just as we earlier linked the difficulties of the NRA to the historically explicable absence of relevant administrative strength in the U.S. national state, our explanation for the AAA's better performance looks back historically from the vantage point of the USDA's special administrative contributions. In general, as shown above, the civil administrative capacities of the U.S. national state in the 1930s were weak and poorly coordinated. But the historical development of different parts of the federal government had been uneven, and at the coming of the Great Depression, the U.S. Department of Agriculture was, so to speak, an island of state strength in an ocean of weakness. Although it did not achieve cabinet status until 1889, the Department of Agriculture was founded during the Civil War, when the Southern states were out of the union and when it was both possible and necessary for unprecedented federal initiatives to be taken. Influenced by the period of its birth, Agriculture enjoyed from its inception an unusual degree of administrative unity and flexibility: few component bureaus were legislatively created by Congress, and all but the top officials (and the head of the Weather Bureau) were subject to appointment and removal by the head Tracing the genealogy of the USDA as an administrative part of government provides useful background information. Yet for the purpose of understanding the origins of agricultural planning in the New Deal, it is even more important to see the USDA as part of a larger nexus of institutions that functioned-to a unique degree in pre-1930s U.S. national politics-to bring professional expertise to bear on public issues and on governmental policymaking about them. At about the same time as the USDA was created, the Morrill Act was passed, authorizing federal land grants to support the establishment in each state of a college oriented to agricultural research and education. In practice, these "landgrant colleges" were slow to establish themselves, and their greatest impact on farm practices came after the establishment of federally subsidized, state-run Experiment Stations in 1887 and the federalization of the Extension Service in 1914. By the end of the nineteenth century, though, the USDA was already recruiting many of its civil servants from the land-grant colleges. Indeed, characteristic career lines were beginning to carry individuals from the colleges to Experiment Stations (or Extension Service posts), then into the Department of Agriculture, and perhaps finally back to administrative positions in the colleges or in state agricultural programs.59
One impact of the connection between the USDA and the land-grant colleges was, predictably, to solidify the department's distinctive collective identity. From the "homogeneity of origin, training, and type of career and professional interest of those who were rising to the higher posts in the permanent civil service of the USDA there emerged a corporate atmosphere in the Department."60 Thus, looking back historically, the authors of a 1940 Social Science Research Council (SSRC) study of public administration in the USDA were able to conclude that "the personality factor" -that is, the influence of extraordinary entre- During the 1920s, farm pressure groups used government-collected statistics to highlight the disastrous decline in farm income, and political demands mounted for government corrective action. Agricultural experts-whether current, former, or prospective government employees-grappled with politically proposed solutions and in many cases formulated proposals of their own. Many divergent answers were offered during the debates of the 1920s and the early depression. The sheer proliferation of demands for government action reflected the previous contacts of farmers with the USDA (and with the state-level programs associated with the department). Similarly, the proliferation of technically and administratively sophisticated proposals reflected the ease with which, in the agricultural sector of the U.S. political economy, professionally trained people had for some time moved freely from scholarship to application, from academia to government policymaking and implementation. Both farmers and agricultural experts were, so to speak, "state-broken" well before the New Deal launched its planning efforts.
More than that, and finally perhaps most decisive of all, many agricultural experts were willing to make policy for, rather than just with, the farmers and their organizations.63 Accustomed to the challenges of public office, their training and career experiences had given them a concrete sense of what could (and could not) be done with available governmental means. Having gained a publicservice perspective-or, to put it another way, having learned to take the point 61 Gaus and Wolcott, Public Administration and the USDA, p. 86. 62 Ibid., pp. 35-37. 63 In his Social Scientists and Farm Politics, Richard Kirkendall argues that the agricultural experts were more than merely "servants of power," that is, paid experts working for farmers' organizations (or, for that matter, for business executives). He contrasts them to the experts work- ministrative leadership imbued with an "interventionist role definition," a collective sense that it can diagnose, and use state intervention to act upon, socioeconomic problems. In his study of European administrators and state activities to promote economic development, Armstrong writes that a "large measure of organizational unity and homogeneity in socialization among elite administrators has been crucial for development [of an] interventionist role definition," and he also points to the importance of administrative field experience, scientific education, and exposure to "systematic economics training."67 Stepan asks how certain militaries in Latin America in the 1960s moved from a narrowly military definition of their roles to a collective belief that the military could and should take responsibility for national economic development; his answer focuses on the broadening of military education to include studies of society and the economy as a whole as well as techniques of economic planning.68 As shown above, USDA administrators and agricultural-economics experts went through experiences analogous to Armstrong's interventionist administrators and Stepan's "new" military professionals: their education and career experiences tended to forge a corporate identity, the USDA itself was administratively unified to a high degree, and both government experience and social-scientific training encouraged the combination of technical expertise and orientation to practical action with a holistic view of agriculture in the national economy.
Second, the U.S. agricultural complex historically nurtured not only an administrative will to intervene but also a process of "political learning" about what could be effectively done for farmers and society as a whole through public agricultural policy. In a ground-breaking study of the long-term development of social policies in modern Britain and Sweden, Hugh Heclo maintains that politics "finds its source not only in power but also in uncertainty -men [ In the case of the relatively successful Agricultural Adjustment Administration, the New Deal was indeed able to draw on a well-established governmentally centered tradition of political learning about what needed to be and could be done through government intervention in agriculture. The policy innovators and eventual policy implementors were not simply government officials, for they had moved into and out of government posts and carried experiences back and forth from government to educational institutions, maintaining contacts in the processes with major farm interest groups.72 Yet, there was an important thread of continuity in the succession of programs implemented by the USDA. As the authors of the 1940 Social Science Research Council study of the USDA put it, in a formulation strikingly like Hugh Heclo's "political learning" argument:
Since 1932 public attention has been centered upon the New Deal program as marking a sharp reversal in trends in government policy; nevertheless, the more we study the evolution of agricultural policies the more we are impressed with their continuity over an extended period, notwithstanding changes in party control of government. Changes occur, but the new policy will be found to have roots in some undramatic research, fact-gathering, information-providing or similar "noncoercive" activity .... Civil servants assigned to the task of analysis come upon situations in which a public interest is discovered.... in this evolutionary process the functions of government are changed....73
What is more, the SSRC authors might have said, in this way the basis is laid for a successful extension of government administrative intervention when a political conjuncture such as that of 1932-1933 creates the opportunity.
Like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the National Industrial Recovery Act created an extraordinary opportunity to extend government intervention into the economy. But, leading into the depression, no properly political learning had been going on to lay the basis for the NRA. Such learning as was going on in the 1920s about how to plan for industry was happening within particular in-71 Ibid., pp. 305-6. 72 Heclo argues that policy innovations usually come from "middlemen at the interfaces of various groups" (ibid., pp. 308-9). The interesting thing about the complex of agricultural institutions in the United States was that it encouraged (and allowed) trained people to move about from colleges to extension posts to the USDA, and so forth, within the public world of American agriculture. Farmers' associations were active at many points in this world, so experts were never divorced from "politics" even as they maintained their own scientific and administrative roles.
I CGaus and Wolcott, Public Administration and the USDA, p. 69. Part 1 of this study is, indeed, coherently constructed around a highly insightful "political learning" argument. The book bears reading not only for its "facts" but also for its sophisticated argument about the historical interplay of USDA development, farm politics, and agricultural policymaking and implementation. dustries, with trade association leaders doing the learning.74 When the federal government withdrew from even nominal control of industry after World War I, it left the field clear to the giant corporations and to the trade associations, whose efforts Hoover simply encouraged and attempted to coordinate, instead of building up independent governmental apparatuses. Thus, when the depression struck and the New Deal found itself committed to the sponsorship of industrial planning, there was only "the analogue of war" to draw upon-an invocation of the emergency mobilization practices used during World War I.'5 Yet, in the depression, government's job was much more difficult: not just exhorting maximum production from industry, but stimulating recovery and allocating burdens in a time of scarcity. For this, a tradition of political learning-from prior public administrative supervision of industry-would have been invaluable. But, in contrast to the situation in agriculture, the U.S. state lacked the "administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise for new policy lessons and appropriate conclusions" on the "increasingly complex issues" presented by the challenge of industrial planning. Thus the National Recovery Administration failed in its mission of coordinating industrial production under the aegis of public supervision, and the apparent opportunity offered by the National Industrial Recovery Act's extraordinary peacetime grant of economic authority to the U.S. government was lost. The reach of the New Deal's ambitious early venture into industrial planning simply exceeded the grasp that could be afforded by the public institutions and intelligence of the day. 
